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ABSTRACT
Federal hazardous waste regulation and cleanup programs suffer from poor prioritization,
insufficient flexibility, high costs, and questionable benefits. Many of these problems are a
result of excessive regulatory centralization. With the enactment of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Comprehensive Emergency Response, Cleanup and Liability Act
(CERCLA, aka “Superfund”) Congress centralized environmental policy questions that are, in
many respects, inherently local in nature. This produced a “mismatch” between those
jurisdictions with regulatory primacy and the nature of the environmental problems at issue.
Contamination of soil and groundwater are site-specific, rarely crossing state lines. Due to the
local nature of hazardous waste problems, state governments should be given the opportunity to
assume leadership of hazardous waste regulation and cleanup. While the federal government has
an important role to play in the regulation and management of hazardous wastes, this role
requires more targeted and specialized efforts than the adoption and maintenance of a
comprehensive cradle-to-grave regulatory system and a large scale waste site cleanup program
that impose federal standards on local communities. Through technical guidance federal
agencies can inform local waste management and cleanup decisions without imposing uniform
federal standards that fit few jurisdictions well. With federal efforts confined to those areas in
which the federal government possesses a comparative advantage, state governments will be
freed to reassume leadership in hazardous waste policy and tailor state policies to local needs and
concerns. This, in turn, could foster greater recognition of and accountability for the trade-offs
inherent in hazardous waste policy, and a more justifiable regulatory regime for hazardous waste.
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REFORMING OUR WASTEFUL HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY
Jonathan H. Adler*

INTRODUCTION

Federal hazardous waste regulation and cleanup programs suffer from poor prioritization,
insufficient flexibility, high costs, and questionable benefits. Many of these problems are a
result of excessive regulatory centralization. The federal government has assumed primary
responsibility for hazardous waste policy, placing states in a secondary role, even though the
environmental threats posed by hazardous waste are generally quite localized. Hazardous waste
itself is not a form of pollution, but rather a “precursor to pollution.”1 It only becomes an
environmental problem when mismanaged, and allowed to contaminate land or water. Properly
managed, however, hazardous waste is not a particularly pressing environmental concern. And
when improperly handled, hazardous waste tends to create fairly localized environmental
concerns. Contamination of soil and groundwater are site-specific, rarely crossing state lines.
Unlike much air and water pollution, mismanagement of hazardous waste does not involve
*

Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law. This paper was prepared for the New York Law School-New York University School of Law project
“Breaking the Logjam: An Environmental Law for the 21st Century.” Thanks to Tai Antoine for her able research
assistance, and to David Schoenbrod, Richard Stewart, Stephanie Tatham, and participants in the N.Y.U. School of
Law Environmental Governance workshop and Breaking the Logjam Conference for comments and critiques. Any
errors, omissions, or wastefulness are solely the fault of the author.
1

Hilary Sigman, Taxing Hazardous Waste: The U.S. Experience, 3 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 12, 13 (2003).
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substantial interstate externalities of the sort that would typically justify the imposition of federal
regulation.
State governments should be given the opportunity to assume leadership of hazardous
waste regulation and cleanup. While the federal government has an important role to play in the
regulation and management of hazardous wastes, this role should be far more circumscribed and
targeted than under existing law. A more decentralized regulatory regime could produce more
transparent and forthright accounting of the trade-offs inherent in hazardous waste management
and cleanup, encourage the development of more targeted and location specific remedial
measures, and foster a more effective hazardous waste policy for the future.

I.

FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS

National attention only turned to the environmental problems associated with hazardous
waste well after the process of environmental policy centralization had begun.2 Prior to that
point, federal efforts focused on the more visible problems of air and water pollution.3 The
gradual nationalization of waste policy occurred with relatively little consideration of the proper
roles of the federal and state governments in safeguarding the nation’s water and soil. Fed by

2

For a brief overview of the federalization of environmental regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of
Federal Environmental Regulation, 55 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 93 (2004).
3

See Paul Weiland & Rosemary O’Leary, Federalism and Environmental Policy: The Case of Solid Waste
Management, 27 AMER. REV. PUB. ADMN. 211, 213 (1997) ( “waste disposal was not recognized as an
environmental problem until after air and water quality problems were recognized.”). Somewhat ironically, air and
water pollution control measures increased the waste disposal problem insofar as pollution controls increased the
generation of wastes containing pollutants removed from air emissions and liquid effluent. See MICHAEL B.
GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 19-20
(1994).
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public hysteria, Congress adopted legislative programs with minimal discussion and debate. The
initial provisions governing hazardous waste contained in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) 4 were largely an afterthought to the newly enacted federal solid waste
law.5 Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA, aka “Superfund”)6 during a lame-duck legislative session with minimal
debate in response to the perceived “crisis” of abandoned waste sites.7
With both RCRA and CERCLA, and subsequent legislative amendments, Congress
centralized environmental policy questions that are, in many respects, inherently local in nature.
This produced a “mismatch” between those jurisdictions with regulatory primacy and the nature
of the environmental problems at issue.8 While federal legislators and agency officials were
“contemptuous of the capacity of state and local governments” to address hazardous waste
concerns, the legislation they adopted decreased state and local political responsibility and
accountability, further compromising the development of sound hazardous waste policy.9 With
Superfund in particular, “the design of the program did not seek to promote decentralization or to
4

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k.

5

See MARK K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS – FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 93 (1994). Only one of the sixteen legislative findings
contained in the 1976 Act concerned hazardous waste, and it merely noted that such waste presents “special dangers
to health and requires a greater degree of regulation than does non-hazardous solid waste.” Id.
6

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.

7

LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 164 (Congress “failed to deliberate about the basic strategic choices regarding
program design and resource allocation” when passing Superfund).

8

For an overview of the problem of “jurisdictional mismatch” in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler,
Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005); see also Henry N. Butler &
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996) (advocating a “match” between the scope of environmental
problems and regulatory jurisdictions).
9

LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 165. Interestingly enough, at least one state, New Jersey, adopted a hazardous
waste cleanup statute several years before Congress would enact CERCLA. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 596 (2001) (discussing the New
Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act adopted in 1976).
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enhance the role of the states”10 – a choice that undermined political accountability for hazardous
waste policy.11
Both programs have been plagued with excessive rigidity, poor prioritization, and
minimal consideration of ecological (let alone economic) trade-offs.12 Under existing federal
hazardous waste regulations, “society spends a disproportionate amount of resources addressing
a relatively limited selection of the risks posed by toxic materials.”13 Existing federal hazardous
waste regulations and cleanup requirements seem to be more a reaction to “popular fears” than a
rational approach to “reducing actual risks.”14 While hazardous waste may have ranked high in
public perceptions of environmental risks, subsequent EPA analyses concluded that the actual
health risks posed by hazardous wastes have been “overrated.”15
Under RCRA, the EPA regulates the generation, management, and disposal of hazardous
wastes. CERCLA, in contrast, governs the cleanup of sites subject to hazardous waste
contamination. Together, the two statutes impose extensive federal requirements on firms with
nearly any connection to the creation, ownership, or disposal of wastes deemed hazardous by the

10

LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 239.

11

Id. (“This allowed citizens to continue to treat hazardous waste as a problem someone else was going to solve for
them.”).

12

See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
153, 154 (1988) (“the system has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Sovietstyle planning of the economy to achieve environmental goals”); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING
SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 179-83 (1999) (summarizing problems of overly
centralized environmental regulation).
13

Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1521
(1995).
14

Id. at 1519 (“Important aspects of Superfund and RCRA seem geared more to responding to these popular fears
than reducing actual risks.”).
15

LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 297 (citing EPA assessments of relative risks posed by various environmental
problems subject to EPA regulation); see also J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATIING POLLUTION:
DOES THE U.S. SYSTEM WORK? __ (1997).
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federal government. These requirements are imposed with little regard for local risk preferences,
environmental priorities, or ecological conditions.

A. RCRA

Enacted in 1976, RCRA was the first federal statute governing solid waste.16 RCRA’s
Subtitle C creates a comprehensive “cradle-to-grave” regulatory regime for hazardous waste.17
Subtitle C and the relevant implementing regulations govern the generation, transportation,
storage, treatment and disposal of wastes classified as hazardous. In 1984, Congress amended
RCRA with the explicit purpose of constraining EPA discretion, forcing more stringent federal
regulation, and discouraging land disposal of hazardous wastes. The 1984 amendments also
added a Corrective Action program governing the cleanup of RCRA sites that operates much like
the Superfund program discussed below, as well as regulatory provisions specifically targeted at
underground storage tanks, such as those used by service stations to store gasoline. As a whole,
RCRA imposes “a detailed , stringent, and frequently confusing” regulatory scheme.18 Noted

16

Hilary Sigman, Hazardous Waste and Toxic Substance Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 2nd ed. 218 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds. 2000). RCRA Subtitle C governs hazardous
waste. Other portions of RCRA govern other waste-related concerns. Subtitle D, for example, concerns solid waste,
but is less prescriptive than subtitle C.
17

See U.S. EPA, RCRA ORIENTATION MANUAL 2006 (2006), at I-4 (“RCRA Subtitle C establishes a federal
program to manage hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.”), available at
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/general/orientat/rom1.pdf (last visited November 18, 2007). Some would even say
that RCRA regulates wastes “well beyond the grave.” See Amer. Iron & Steel Inst. V. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 393
(D.C. Cir. 1989).

18

Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The “Mind-Numbing” Provisions of the Most Complicated
Environmental Statute, in RCRA DESKBOOK 3 (1991). Of note, Hill wrote this description of RCRA while an
attorney at the U.S. EPA. Id.
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environmental attorney Michael Gerrard observes, RCRA is “one of the most relentlessly
command-and-control statutes ever written.”19
Structurally, RCRA adopts a fairly standard “cooperative federalism” model, under
which the federal government encourages states to implement their own regulatory programs in
accordance with federal standards.20 States that adopt their own hazardous regulations may seek
authorization from the EPA to implement and enforce the federal program in the EPA’s stead.21
In order to obtain such authorization, the relevant state program must meet or exceed the
stringency of the respective federal rules and ensure adequate levels of enforcement. These
requirements are imposed quite rigidly, so states must meet or exceed EPA standards in every
detail.22 States are not permitted to relax one regulatory provision in return for tightening
another. Such trade-offs are barred.
Authorization of a state program makes the state eligible for federal funding, but such
funding does not cover the costs of implementing even the core regulatory provisions of Subtitle
C.23 Nor does the authorization process allow for much state flexibility. At present, the vast

19

MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE
SITING 206 (1994).
20

See Babich, supra note __, at 1534 (“the essence of cooperative federalism is that states take primary
responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent
standards.”). See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has the authority
to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the
choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.
. . . This arrangement . . . has been termed cooperative federalism.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).

21

See 42 U.S.C. § 6926.

22

See generally 40 C.F.R. § 271.14.

23

See ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS, STATE RCRA SUBTITLE
C CORE HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION COSTS—FINAL REPORT (January 2007).
Although states are required to provide a 25 percent match for federal grants for RCRA implementation, “EPA
currently provides only about 40% of the total funds necessary for States to run complete and adequate RCRA C
programs.” Id. at 3. The funding shortfall is estimated at approximately $90 million. Id. at 4.
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majority of states have obtained authorization to implement some portion of RCRA’s rules.24 As
of September 2007, however, only one state (Idaho) had authorization to implement 100 percent
of the EPA’s RCRA rules.25
While the federal-state relationship in hazardous waste regulation is supposed to be
“cooperative,” many states have found it difficult to satisfy the EPA’s requirements for
regulatory primacy. Implementation of RCRA’s requirements can be “incredibly confusing.”26
An early assessment by EPA itself found a widespread perception among regulators and
regulated alike that “standards for what constitutes adequate state capability [were] unclear and a
moving target.”27 The EPA and state regulatory agencies have also fought over enforcement
priorities.28

As a consequence, state innovation in hazardous waste management has been

somewhat limited.29
In 2005, approximately 15,000 firms qualified as large quantity generators of hazardous
waste under RCRA.30 Yet a small percentage of hazardous waste generators are responsible for
the majority of hazardous waste,31 and most hazardous waste is disposed at the point of

24

U.S. EPA, “RCRA State Authorization,” available at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/state/index.htm
(last visited November 18, 2007).

25

See U.S. EPA, “Rule Authorization Percentage,” available at
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/state/stats/charts/statecom.pdf (last visited November 18, 2007)..
26

Babich, supra note __, at 1539.

27

U.S. EPA, THE RCRA IMPLEMENTATION STUDY: THE NATION’S HAZARDOUS ASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A
CROSSROADS (1990).
28

See, e.g., Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1998).

29

Babich, supra note __, at 1540 (noting RCRA’s complexity “has generally prevented [states] from attempting
significant innovations.”).

30

U.S. EPA, THE NATIONAL BIENNIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT (BASED ON 2005 DATA) – NATIONAL ANALYSIS
4-1 (2006).
31

GERRARD, supra note __, at 8 (one percent of hazardous waste generators create 97 percent of hazardous wastes).
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generation.32 In that year, these firms generated over 38 million tons of designated hazardous
waste.33 While these figures may sound somewhat ominous, the volume of waste produced is
not a particularly useful indicator of actual environmental risk.
Not all substances designated as “hazardous wastes” when disposed of are particularly
hazardous. Rather, “’hazardous waste’ and ‘hazardous substances’ are terms of art that say more
about the legal status of chemicals than about the dangers those chemicals present.”34 Under
RCRA, a “hazardous waste” is defined as:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may (A) cause,
or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present
or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.35
While some wastes may be classified as hazardous because they demonstrate particular
characteristics, most “hazardous” wastes receive this designation because they are listed as such

32

Id. at 8.

33

Id.

34

Babich, supra note __, at 1519.

35

42 U.S.C. §6903 (5). Under RCRA, “solid waste” is defined as:
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution
control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous
material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community
activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under
section 1342 of title 33, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 923).

42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
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by the EPA, a practice which has led to the listing of some “benign” wastes.36 Mixtures of
nonhazardous and listed hazardous wastes are also classified as hazardous under RCRA, as are
wastes, such as incinerator ash, that are “derived from” listed hazardous wastes, irrespective of
whether the wastes in question exhibit hazardous properties. Perhaps paradoxically, RCRA
exempts small waste generators, and some wastes which would seem to present sufficient
ecological risks to justify a “hazardous” designation are exempt.37 The rationale for such
exemptions is “probably more political than environmental,” raising more questions about
RCRA’s environmental benefits.38
Once a waste is classified as “hazardous,” a basic menu of regulatory strictures falls in
place. The health and ecological risks posed by different types of wastes can “vary greatly.”39
In straightforward terms, “hazardousness is not a dichotomous characteristic.”40 Nonetheless,
RCRA’s regulatory requirements for different types of waste do not vary based upon the relevant
risks and costs.41
One of RCRA’s goals is to encourage greater waste reduction and recycling, and it may
have done so. In some cases, however, RCRA regulations increase the costs associated with
hazardous waste recovery and recycling. For example, the implementation of RCRA regulations
designed to prevent “sham” recycling and prevent soil or groundwater contamination resulting

36

Sigman, supra note __, at 219.

37

Id. at 219; see also Babich, supra note __, at 1520 (“Congress and EPA have defined the term ‘hazardous waste’
to exclude many potentially dangerous materials.”).
38

Sigman, supra note __, at 219.

39

Id. at 218 (“Wastes vary greatly in the threats they pose.”); id. at 232 (“Any waste categorized as hazardous faces
the same regulatory requirements, although wastes may vary greatly in the nature and extent of the dangers they
pose.”).

40

LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 94.

41

Sigman, supra note __, at 232.
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from insufficient safeguards also inflate the cost of legitimate hazardous waste recycling, in
some cases increasing the volume of waste generated that is subject to RCRA’s regulatory
requirements.42 Similarly, cost-effective waste reduction or disposal options can be inhibited by
regulatory requirements. 43 RCRA’s land disposal restrictions have also “dramatically increased
waste management costs for many facilities.”44 Such cost increases likely increased incentives
for waste reduction and reuse, but may also have increased incentives for illegal dumping and
disposal. Insofar as burdensome and delay-ridden permit requirements obstruct the opening of
new disposal sites, they may “harm the environment by perpetuating old, substandard
facilities.”45 Further, some companies unsure of how RCRA regulations will be applied to their
specific operations engage in precautionary “overcompliance,” which further increases the costs
of such rules.”46
RCRA also imposes significant manifest and record-keeping requirements to facilitate the
tracking of hazardous waste shipments and ensure proper management and disposal. In practice,
however, these requirements “do not seem to have helped enforce hazardous waste laws.”47 J
Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek concur: “Despite RCRA’s broad tracking and reporting
provisions for hazardous waste, few data exist to show whether the law is achieving its goals.”48

42

See Jonathan H. Adler, The Hazards of Regulating Hazardous Waste, REG., vol. 16, no. 2, Spring 1993, available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg16n2g.html.

43

James Boyd, the Barriers to Corporate Pollution Prevention: An analysis of Three Cases, in IMPROVING
REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY 100 (Paul S. Fischbeck & R. Scott Farrow eds. 2001).
44

Sigman, supra note __, at 226.

45

GERRARD, supra note __, at 82.

46

Id. at 147.

47

Sigman, supra note __, at 223.

48

DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note __, at 20.
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While these regulations are well-intentioned, and designed to address real environmental
concerns, their uniform and largely unwavering application across industries and regions reduces
their environmental value. All told, “we know little about [RCRA’s] effect on the environment,”
concludes economist Hilary Sigman in an analysis conducted for Resources for the Future.49
“RCRA may have reduced environmental contamination of air, groundwater, surface water, and
soils. However, there are no measures of these changes, let alone evaluations of how human
health and the environment benefited from reduced contamination.”50 Improvements in
hazardous waste management over the past three decades may have been due to RCRA. At the
same time, many of these improvements may have been driven by increased environmental
awareness within corporations and among the general public, liability concerns, and local
regulatory measures. In any event, RCRA is ripe for reform.

B. CERCLA (“Superfund”)

Congress enacted CERCLA in response to a perceived “crisis” of widespread, abandoned
and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites during a lame-duck session following the Presidential
election of 1980.51 The contamination of Love Canal, New York was particularly influential in

49

Sigman, supra note __, at 229.

50

Sigman, supra note __, at 229. But see Babich, supra note __, at 1522 (suggesting that RCRA and CERCLA
“have dramatically improved environmental protection.”).

51

CERCLA was enacted on December 11, 1980. Of note, no committee report addressed the specific bill Congress
enacted. See John Quarles & Michael W. Steinberg, The Superfund Program at Its 25th Anniversary, 36 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10364, 10364 (2006). See also Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut that Failed, in BREAKING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK 117 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1997) (“Superfund was enacted in an atmosphere
of crisis.”).
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driving passage of the Superfund statute.52 Yet the cause of waste contamination at Love Canal
was not necessarily the result of irresponsible waste management practices by private industry,53
nor is it clear the contamination created significant health risks for local residents.54
CERCLA was intended to facilitate the rapid cleanup of contaminated sites and create a
liability scheme to ensure that those firms potentially responsible for site contamination would
be held financially responsible. The principle was “shovels first, lawyers later.”55 The statute
also created a trust fund, the “Superfund” of the statute’s name, to be used to finance site cleanup
where potentially responsible parties had yet to be identified or contribute to cleanup costs.
Although the cleanup and management of polluted properties would seem to be a local concern,
CERCLA displaces state authority to a significantly greater extent than the major federal statutes
governing air and water pollution.56 Largely due to its expansive liability provisions, which
impose strict, joint and several liability on potentially responsible parties for waste site cleanup,
Superfund is possibly the EPA’s “most controversial and most visible” program.57

52

See LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 133-42 (describing how Love Canal contamination drove perception of
hazardous waste crisis and the eventual passage of Superfund).

53

See Stroup, supra note __; Jerry Taylor, Salting the Earth: The Case for Repealing Superfund, REG., vol. 18, no. 2
(1995);Eric Zeusse, Love Canal: The Truth Seeps Out, REASON, Feb. 1981. As Landy, et al., summarize, Love
Canal’s public prominence was “the result of an admixture of faulty science, bureaucratic maneuvering, and
electoral exigency.” LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 140.
54

Subsequent analyses of the health consequences of Love Canal’s contamination also cast doubt on initial claims.
See Mark Reisch, Brownfield Issues in the 107th Congress, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Apr. 24, 2007, at CRS-1,
n.1; LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 133 (noting lack of epidemiological studies documenting increased health risks
from Love Canal contamination).
55

LANDY, ET AL., supra note __, at 142.

56

James P. Young, Expanding State Initiation and Enforcement under Superfund, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 999
(1990). See also Cannon, supra at 603 (noting “the interstate externalities argument for Superfund does not seem
particularly strong compared to similar arguments for other federal environmental statutes”).
57

See, e.g., Katherine N. Probst & Diane Sherman, Success for Superfund: A New Approach for Keeping Score
(Resources for the Future, April 2004), at 1 (“The Superfund program is one of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) most controversial and most visible programs.”).

DRAFT – Not for Citation

Adler, Haz. Waste – Page 13

Over 45,000 waste sites are listed in the EPA’s Superfund inventory.58 From among
these sites, the EPA created a “National Priorities List” of sites eligible for federally funded
cleanup. As of 2007, the EPA has listed over 1,500 sites on the NPL.59 While the NPL
theoretically represents those sites in most dire need of federal attention, there are reasons to
suspect that the NPL may not consistently represent those sites of greatest environmental
concern.60 At this point, it is reasonable to conclude that “the major risks from hazardous waste
sites have probably been addressed through emergency removal actions.”61
As originally implemented, the EPA defined “success” as completing cleanup of a site
and deleting it from the NPL. Yet many sites required monitoring and potential cleanup
activities decades after their listing on the NPL, prompting the EPA in 1990 to redefine success
as the completion of all physical construction necessary for site cleanup, “even if final cleanup
levels or other requirements for the site have not been met.”62 By this measure, it is easier for
the EPA to report “success” under CERCLA.
In 2007, EPA reported that it had completed construction at 1030, or approximately twothirds, of all sites on the NPL.63 This number may not increase particularly rapidly in the years
ahead, however, as many EPA offices appear to have focused their resources on sites requiring
58

Testimony of Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator, U.S. EPA, on “Superfund Oversight,” Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee, Superfund, toxics, Risk and Waste Management Subcommittee, June
16, 2006, 2006 WLNR 10423590 (noting EPA and “partners” have conducted assessments at 46,515 sites).

59

U.S. EPA, “Superfund National Accomplishments Summary Fiscal Year 2007,” available at
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/numbers07.htm (last visited November 18, 2007).

60

Sigman, supra note __, at 235.

61

DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note __, at 21.

62

Probst & Sherman, supra note __, at 1-2. See also Jonathan Z. Cannon, Adaptive Management in Superfund:
Thinking Like a Contaminated Site, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 561, 564 (2005) (“as it turned out, Superfund clean ups
took much longer than intitially anticipated, and, even more significantly for our purposes, most Superfund sites
have contaminants remaining after the remedy is completed and will require long-term monitoring and review.”).
63

U.S. EPA, “Superfund National Accomplishments Summary Fiscal Year 2007,” available at
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/numbers07.htm (last visited November 18, 2007).
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shorter or less complicated cleanup operations, leaving sites requiring “more complex, lengthy,
and expensive cleanups” to be addressed in the future.64 Further, the construction complete
measure is, at best, an “indicator of interim progress” and provides little “information on what
the program has accomplished in terms of protecting human health and the environment,
reducing risk to those living and working near sites, or reducing contamination and risks to the
environment.”65 Empirical research finds little evidence that EPA prioritizes waste site cleanups
based upon the actual environmental risks sites present to local communities and surrounding
ecosystems.66
Superfund is “notorious for fostering too much litigation and too little actual cleanup.”67
Under the statute, any firm that generated, transported, or managed hazardous materials
discovered at a waste site may be held liable for cleanup costs. The average cost for cleaning up
a single waste site is approximately $20 million, according to the Congressional Research
Service, which leads potentially liable firms to pursue litigation or other means of spreading the
cleanup costs among other potentially responsible parties.68 At some sites, the number of
potentially responsible parties may reach into the hundreds of firms.69

64

Probst & Sherman, supra note __, at 2-3; Cannon, supra note __, at 594.

65

Probst & Sherman, supra note __, at 3.

66

Hilary Sigman, The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites: Policy Goals and Interest Group Influence, NBER
WORKING PAPER NO. 7704 (May 2000).
67

Babich, supra note __, at 1520.

68

Reisch, supra note __, at CRS-7. As Rhoads and Shogren observe, “Superfund pits one firm against another.
This creates an environmental conflict in which several players invest effort to win a fixed reward—the avoided
cleanup costs.” Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization: How Is the Clinton Adminsitraiton Handling Hazardous Waste? 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
FORUM 245, 254 (1998).
69

Reisch, supra note __, at CRS-7.
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Under Superfund regulations, the EPA may require cleanup measures even where
opposed by local residents or otherwise unjustified by demonstrable risks to public health.70
Federal oversight and control of waste site cleanup has meant that federal law drives land-use
decisions concerning once contaminated lands, leading to conflict with local communities and
state and local governments.71 Although the EPA is required to consult with state officials when
making cleanup decisions, it need not obtain state approval for site remedies. The EPA’s efforts
to develop standardized protocols has also led to largely haphazard remedy selection.72 The cost
per cancer case averted varies greatly from site to site, but can be quite high when compared to
the cost-effectiveness of other environmental programs. While some sites may present
significant health risks that can be ameliorated at a reasonable cost, an analysis by James
Hamilton and Kip Viscusi found that the cost per cancer case averted was over $100 million at
seventy percent of current Superfund sites.73
Superfund was initially funded by the imposition of a corporate income tax and excise
taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstocks. The Superfund taxes generated approximately $1.5
billion per year until the taxes expired at the end of 1995.74 Since that time, the Superfund has
been funded by the U.S. Treasury out of general tax revenues. The justification for the

70

See, e.g, Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut that Failed, in BREAKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
GRIDLOCK 128 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1997) (discussing controversial cleanup lead tailings at mine sites in Idaho
and Colorado).
71

See, e.g., Young, supra note __, at 990 (“CERCLA’s displacement of the states in the cleanup process creates
potential sources of friction between the federal and state governments.”).

72

See Sigman, supra note __, at 238-39.

73

See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly Is Clean? An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of
Superfund Site Remediations, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 2 (1999). See also John Quarles & Michael W.
Steinberg, The Superfund Program at Its 25th Anniversary, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10364, 10367 (2006) (“To the extent
that Superfund is viewed as a national program for the protection of public health, there are many other federal
environmental programs that provide far greater health benefits for the costs associated with them.”).
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Mark Reisch, Brownfield Issues in the 107th Congress, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Apr. 24, 2007., at CRS-2.
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Superfund taxes was that corporations generally, and oil and chemical companies in particular,
were most responsible for waste site contamination, so such “polluters” should be those that pay
for the cleanup.75 Yet there is little, if any, relationship between chemical use by firms and their
relative responsibility for environmental contamination. If anything, larger firms are more likely
to have complied with existing regulations and industry best practices, and yet they may have
paid a comparatively larger share of Superfund taxes.
A recent concern about Superfund was its potential to discourage the cleanup and
redevelopment of industrial sites. If the clean up costs for abandoned urban industrial sites to
prepare them for redevelopment were not enough in themselves, the potential for Superfund
liability discouraged investors further.76 The effect of Superfund on such “Brownfields”
prompted the passage of modest Superfund reforms in 2002. At the time these reforms were
adopted, the EPA estimated there were over 500,000 brownfield sites in the United States that
were “underutilized or ignored, posing health risks and impeding the revitalization of inner city
neighborhoods, which were once important centers of industrial activity.”77 The 2002 reforms
relaxed liability for some innocent landowners so as to reduce the disincentive to cleanup and
reuse potentially contaminated sites. One purpose of the Brownfields reform was to remove a
substantial barrier to private company participation in state voluntary cleanup programs.
Another problem with Superfund has been its potential to inhibit technological innovation in
waste remediation.78
75

But see LANDY ET AL., supra note __, at 148 (summarizing argument that Superfund taxes did not embody
“polluter pays” principle as intended).

76

Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Redevelopment, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 59, 67 (2003).

77

Id. at 64.

78

See Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and
Democracy Reconcilable? 92 NW. U. L. REV. 706, 718 (1998).
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Superfund has not been a total waste. The one aspect of CERCLA universally
recognized as a success is the emergency cleanup and removal provisions. Some even term these
provisions “one of the great environmental achievements” of federal environmental policy.79
Over the past 27 years, the EPA has conducted approximately 9,000 removal actions at over
6,000 waste sites.80 Removal actions address potential environmental contamination and health
threats not necessarily addressed by the remedial program.81 Contrary to some assumptions,
removal actions continue to require significant outlays. The requirements of quick and efficient
waste removal appear to justify continued federal involvement in this regard. Even those
removal actions that are not “emergency” actions are typically “time-critical” actions.82

II.

DEVOLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY

A consequence of both RCRA and CERCLA is the excessive centralization of hazardous
waste policy to the detriment of sound environmental policy. As an environmental concern,
hazardous waste rarely presents the sort of risks that typically justify federal regulation. As
noted above, the waste itself is not pollution but a “precursor to pollution.” It only causes
pollution if improperly handled or disposed of, where its primary environmental effect is its

79

See J. William Futrell, Superfund and Reactionary Rhetoric, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 56.

80

Bodine, supra note __.

81

KATHERINE N. PROBST & DAVID M. KONISKY, SUPERFUND’S FUTURE: WHAT WILL IT COST? 16 (2001).

82

Id. at 22, Figure 2-1 (illustrating that most removal actions FY1992-1999 were either emergency responses or
time-critical removal acitons).
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potential to contaminate water resources, groundwater in particular.83 The cleanup of individual
hazardous waste sites is also a localized environmental concern. Individual sites “are not
interconnected: they are discrete and usually within the confines of a single state.”84 Their
ecological and economic effects are centered around the sites themselves. Even where such
concerns extend across jurisdictional boundaries, they most often remain quite local problems.
Centralization of hazardous waste policy is particularly difficult to justify if regulatory
structures are to match the scale of targeted environmental concerns. As a general matter,
environmental regulatory measures will tend to be more efficient and effective where there is a
match between the scope of the problem and that of the responsible jurisdiction.85 Air pollution
may permeate a local airshed, spread across broad regions, or even disperse throughout the
global atmosphere. Pollution of rivers and streams can likewise travel great distances, harming
communities throughout a watershed. By comparison, most of the environmental problems most
associated with hazardous waste – such as soil and groundwater contamination – are typically
quite confined. As a consequence, both the costs and benefits of existing environmental
contamination and remedial measures are felt locally. For this reason, it is “logical” to address
waste issues at the state or local level “because of the disparity in the types of waste produced in
different areas of the nation, differing population concentrations, and varying ability of land for
landfilling and other disposal or treatment practices.”86

83

Sigman, supra note __, at 217. Sigman notes that “Although groundwater protection is the primary motivation for
hazardous waste regulation, hazardous waste management may have other environmental costs.” Id. at 218.

84

Young, supra note __, at 998.
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See Adler, Mismatch, supra note __; Butler & Macey, supra note __; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587 (1996) (where the scope of a problem does not match the responsible
institution’s jurisdiction, “the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either too little or too much environmental
protection will be provided.”).
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Weiland & O’Leary, supra note __, at 211.
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The primary environmental concern in hazardous waste management is the potential for
improper waste management and disposal to contaminate local drinking water supplies.87 Yet it
is difficult to identify an environmental concern (other than land-use) where the argument for
federal intervention is weaker – and the argument for local or state control stronger – than
drinking water. As a general matter, drinking water quality in one community has no effect upon
drinking water in neighboring jurisdictions, let alone states half a nation away.88 Even where
underground water pollution crosses state lines, this does not justify the adoption of federal
standards for hazardous waste storage, management and disposal. Targeted interstate remedies
would be preferable.89 If state and local governments lack the capacity to monitor hazardous
waste management practices and site cleanup, this could justify financial and technical support
from the federal government, but not the sort of extensive regulatory programs that now exist.
The improper handling, treatment or disposal of hazardous waste will pose different
levels of environmental risk in different places. Just as some wastes will be more prone to
seeping into groundwater supplies, or more difficult to remediate, some areas will be more
vulnerable to such contamination. A region in which liquid wastes migrate rapidly through
underground water supplies may need more restrictive measures than a region in which the soil

87

This is not to minimize the potential occupational health risks that can result from the improper management and
handling of hazardous materials. Rather, such risks are more properly thought of occupational health risks – the sort
regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration – rather than by the EPA.
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See Paul R. Portney, Environmental Policy in the Next Century, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000
ELECTION AND BEYOND 379 (1999); Terry M. Dinan, Maureen L. Cropper, and Paul R. Portney, Environmental
Federalism: Welfare Losses from Uniform National Drinking Water Standards, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WALLACE E. OATES 14 (Arvind Panagariya, Paul R. Portney, & Robert M.
Schwab eds. 1999).
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See infra.
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is largely impermeable, or where hazardous waste can be effectively isolated.90 Other variations
in the environmental costs of hazardous waste management and disposal could include
population density or other factors.91 When evaluating various sites for waste management and
disposal, it is important to keep in mind that there is no such thing as a “perfect” waste disposal
site, as all siting decisions involve trade-offs.92 At the same time, local environmental
preferences for environmental risk reduction may vary across states, justifying different types of
regulatory measures. The nature of the actual environmental threat, and the relative priority
placed upon regulation or remediation, will vary form place to place.
States already adopt slightly different hazardous waste policies from one another,
reflecting differing ecological conditions and political priorities. For example, many states have
imposed hazardous waste taxes, either feedstock or “waste-end” taxes. Such taxes vary
significantly, which could be due to differences in local environmental preferences or different
environmental costs from hazardous waste generation.93 Such taxes reduce the volume of
hazardous waste generated within the relevant states, even if only by a marginal amount.94 It is
no surprise that state hazardous waste taxes are higher in states with greater membership in
conservation organizations.95 More interesting, “disposal tax rates are higher in states with high
groundwater use, suggesting groundwater protection as a motivation for the taxes.”96
90

Sigman, Taxing, supra note __, at 16 (“Land disposal may cause less damage to the environment in more arid
areas because there is less risk that contaminants seep into groundwater. It could be more costly in places with
greater reliance on groundwater for drinking water, agriculture, and other uses.”).
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Id. at 18.
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If, as some economists believe, the use of such taxes is a more efficient way to address the
potential risks of hazardous wastes than proscriptive regulations,97 it is noteworthy that states
have been more aggressive in this regard than the federal government,98 and that those states that
rely the most on groundwater have been the most aggressive.
The argument for local control of waste site cleanup is even greater than for hazardous
waste management. Theoretically, poor waste management practices in one location could lead
to contamination elsewhere (though the contamination is likely to remain regional). Once a
specific site is contaminated, however, it becomes a local land-use and risk management
concern. The cleanup, and potential redevelopment of an individual site is the quintessential
local environmental concern traditionally left in the hands of state or local governments. Equally
important, decisions about the present and future use of individual sites necessarily requires the
consideration of inherently local knowledge about ecological conditions, economic needs, and
subjective local desires.
As a practical matter, “the Superfund program itself cannot address the full universe of
contaminated sites. The massive number of such sites—hundreds of thousands—exceeds any
plausible reach of direct federal involvement.”99 Each site is different, requiring site-by-site
management and remedy selection.100 “Physical attributes of the sites, such as annual rainfall
and proximity to surface water and groundwater” will “vary greatly” from site to site.101 As a
97

Id. at 24.
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For one account of why there has not been a greater reliance upon such taxes at the federal level, see Marc Landy
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COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
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consequence, “selecting a sound remedial action at a site requires a good dose of common sense
and ‘engineering judgment’ since no two sites are the same.”102
Waste site cleanup and containment decisions require substantial information, much of
which is only available at the local level. As former EPA general counsel Jonathan Cannon
notes, such decisions require information about:
(1) the nature, quantity and location of contaminants on site; (2) site
characteristics, including ecosystem processes such as ground water flow and
microbial activity; (3) costs and effectiveness of remedies; (4) political and
economic conditions affecting cleanup and reuse; (5) values affecting the merits
of alternative site uses.103
With the possible exception of (3), this is all local information, more readily accessible to state
and local officials than federal regulators in Washington, D.C., or even environmental officials in
regional EPA offices. Even the cost and effectiveness of specific remedies will depend, in part,
upon local conditions, the knowledge and understanding of which state and local officials are
more likely to have than their federal counterparts. Lack of knowledge of present conditions and
potential and likely future land uses, for example, can lead to unrealistic risk assessment
calculations and the adoption of cleanup measures substantially more (or less) stringent than
necessary.104
The fifth item in Cannon’s list is particularly important. There is no objective, scientific
way to determine how “clean” a contaminated waste site must be before it is considered “safe,”
102

Testimony of J. Winston Porter, Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on
Superfund and Waste Management, June 15, 2006, available at http://www.winporter.com/testimony4.html.
103
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Cannon, supra note __, at 571-72.

See, e.g., Rhoads & Shogren, supra note __, at 260-61 (describing how failure to account for local land uses at
Idaho Pole Superfund site in Bozeman, Montana led to excessive remediation measures).
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nor is there a single correct answer to how such sites should be managed. Risk preferences, like
aesthetic preferences, are subjective, and will vary from place to place. “The state and local
community typically have strong concerns about the environmental risks at a given site, but they
also may have concerns about other issues,” ranging from site maintenance costs, the impact of
various cleanup plans on future site uses and local economic development, and local quality of
life issues.105 “The local community also stands to reap a substantial portion of the nonenvironmental benefits of clean up, including the benefits that flow from reuse of the site, and
may also be in the best position to assess those benefits.”106
An empirical study of the effect of waste site cleanups on real estate values suggests
“individuals place a small value” on a waste site’s inclusion in the federal Superfund program.107
As reported by the study’s authors, “these findings suggest that the mean local benefits of a
Superfund clean-up as measured through the housing market” are lower than the cost of the
average Superfund site cleanup.”108 This is not likely to be the result of insufficient concern for
hazardous waste contamination in local communities. To the contrary, as economist William
Fischel has documented, local homeowners are a particularly powerful political force, and are
more likely to be overly protective of local home values.109 Homeowners tend to be very risk
averse about local changes or developments that have the potential to depress land values, and
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Cannon, supra note __, at 582.
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Id. at 582.
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Michael Greenstone & Justin Gallagher, Does Hazardous Waste Matter? Evidence from the Housing Market and
the Superfund Program, M.I.T. Dept. of Economics Working Paper 05-27, Sept. 2006, at 2.
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See generally, WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
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this risk aversion “pervades all local political decisions.”110 Even those homeowners who are not
particularly concerned about the environmental effects of proposed developments or industrial
activities are likely to recognize that prospective buyers might.111 As a consequence, if
Superfund cleanups do not increase local property values, it is unlikely that they are providing
meaningful environmental protection. One can go even farther, concluding that “across a wide
range of housing market outcomes, there is little evidence that Superfund clean-ups increase
social welfare substantially. In light of the significant resources devoted to these clean-ups and
the claims of large health benefits, this finding is surprising.”112
Some are concerned that allowing more local control over waste management and
disposal policies will result in more such activities in poorer communities. Such concerns may
be warranted, but it is hardly clear that centralizing and politicizing such decisions is an
improvement. Communities without significant economic resources are unlikely to be
particularly influential within government agencies.113 Byzantine regulatory processes rarely
facilitate public participation by politically marginalized communities. Moreover, some
communities see waste management and disposal facilities as potential “vehicles for economic
development.”114
While it may be tempting to argue that states lack the “scientific, technical or legal
sophistication” necessary to ensure the cleanup and remediation of complex contaminated sites,
this concern is at least “partially offset by the geographic heterogeneity of contaminated sites,

110

Id. at 163.
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where on-the-ground knowledge is of central importance, and the diversity of circumstances is
salient.”115 Further, the federal government could provide much of the necessary technical
know-how without imposing regulatory standards governing site cleanup. It is one thing to
inform a community about contemporary best management practices and the likely consequences
of various cleanup and containment measures. It is quite another to dictate which measures must
be adopted and at what cost.
It is often assumed that there was little ability or effort to control hazardous wastes prior
to the adoption of federal regulations. History suggests otherwise.116 As early as 1924, every
state had statutes governing industrial wastes of some kind, albeit statutes far less protective than
those in place today.117 Intrastate pollution caused by the improper handling or disposal of
hazardous wastes was commonly recognized as a nuisance prior to World War II,118 even if
pollution was rarely prosecuted as a public nuisance,119 and in many states laws specifically
designated pollution from particular industrial wastes as nuisances.120 In some states, local laws
prohibited certain types of industrial activities in densely populated areas.121 While few
corporations were concerned with projecting a “green” image during this period, many firms
recognized the potential liability that could result from poor waste management practices.122 By
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1970, local efforts were more comprehensive, and waste management practices were informed
(albeit not consistently controlled) by various national trade associations with substantial
expertise.123 Much of the hazardous waste pollution that attracted public attention in the 1960s
and 1970s was the result of “casual waste management practices” that often contradicted the best
practices recommended by industry and standard-setting associations, 124 rather than a lack of
knowledge about potential environmental risks.125 Given the potential liability exposure from
such acts, industrial bad actors may have been no more responsible under a modern regulatory
regime.
There is room to debate when and whether states would have adopted more
comprehensive hazardous waste regulations absent RCRA’s impetus. With RCRA in place,
however, most states use federal regulations as a “floor” for their own regulatory programs.126
There is some evidence that states seek RCRA authorization in order to adopt more stringent
regulatory requirements than those imposed by the federal government.127 Sigman found that
“Several states have expanded their definitions [of hazardous waste] beyond the federal
requirements.”128 According to another study, “Over the past 25 years, most states have

123

Id. at 2.
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improved their institutional capacity substantially, and many have adopted innovative programs
that go well beyond the efforts of the federal government.”129
While some environmental analysts express concern that allowing grater state flexibility
could lead to a destructive “race-to-the-bottom,” under which states adopt progressively lax, and
suboptimal, environmental protections, the empirical evidence to date does not support such
concerns.130 In fact, the available empirical evidence suggests that, if anything, any “race”
among jurisdictions is “to the top,” as states seem more likely to increase their environmental
efforts in response to neighboring jurisdictions’ actions than to relax regulation.131 A study of
state groundwater protection found an upward pattern in state efforts to protect groundwater.132
Such data suggests a “race to the top” in the protection of such local resources, rather than a
“race to the bottom.”
States have become particularly aggressive in developing their own waste site cleanup
programs, some of which appear to outperform the federal Superfund program. New Jersey’s
waste cleanup law, the Spill Compensation and Control Act, was adopted in 1976,
contemporaneously with RCRA and several years before CERCLA.133 At the time, New Jersey
was one of the few states to take the problem of waste site cleanup seriously. Today, however,
states are in the lead. States are responsible for the vast majority of hazardous waste cleanups
129

Michael E. Kraft & Denise Scheberle, Environmental Federalism at Decade’s End: New Approaches and
Strategies, 28 PUBLIUS 131, 133 (1998).
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across the United States,” observed New Hampshire Environmental Services Commissioner
Robert W. Varney in 2000.134 Many states are “fully capable of managing all hazardous waste
cleanup programs within their borders, and some already come quite close.135 The number of
state government employees working for state cleanup programs exceeds the number of federal
employees who work on Superfund-related matters.136 By 2001, every state had rules governing
liability for waste site cleanup, and most states had established funds to help pay for cleanup at
abandoned sites.137
Most states have sought to clean up contaminated properties within their borders, even
without delegation of authority from EPA.138 Almost every state has a hazardous waste cleanup
statute of its own.139 In FY 2000, for instance, states completed cleanups at 4,500 non-NPL
sites, almost half of which under state-level voluntary cleanup programs.140 According to the
Environmental Law Institute, by the end of FY 2000, states had cumulatively cleaned up
approximately 29,000 hazardous waste sites since 1976.141 By 2001, 41 states had long-term
stewardship programs to ensure that restore sites did not pose renewed threats to public health.142
All but three states – Vermont, North Dakota, and South Dakota –had formal voluntary cleanup
134

Statement of Robert W. Varney, Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, before
the Committee on Environment & Public Works, Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment,
Mar. 21, 2000, at 2. Varney’s statement was delivered on behalf of the Environmental Council of the States,
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programs in place by the end of 2001, but two of those states still allowed privately initiated
voluntary cleanups.143 Most states have adopted standards and procedures for the use of
institutional controls to limit the future uses of cleanup sites.144 Some have adopted the Uniform
Environmental Covenants Act (UECA), while others have adopted standards of their own.145
Different states have adopted different approaches,146 including different standards for
cleanup liability, and many programs have been quite successful.147 Overall, “the diversity of
approaches taken by the states to the problem of hazardous waste cleanup in their own statutes
reflects different policy trade-offs with respect to those cleanups.”148 As former EPA official J.
Winston Porter noted in 1994:
the 40 states that have hazardous-waste cleanup programs do their work fairly
quickly. In Minnesota, for example, cleanups routinely take two to three years and
cost less than $5 million. New York has restored more than 140 sites, and
Wisconsin has completed work on more than 200—more than all of Superfund.149
The state of New Hampshire is responsible for investigating and overseeing cleanup of 97
percent of the hazardous waste sites in the state.150
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As state authorities have gained greater experience with waste site management and
cleanup, they have increased their effectiveness. The number of sites cleaned up in 2000 was
equivalent to the number cleaned up in 1997, but in 2000 states were able to achieve this cleanup
at 10 percent lower cost.151 There is some dispute whether state sites are, on average, less
contaminated and inherently less costly to remediate than federal sites.152 Without question,
some so-called “mega sites” in the federal program are the largest, most complex, and most
difficult sites to remediate in the nation. Such sites may demand continued federal involvement.
Yet there is no reasons states cannot assume greater authority for the majority of sites now
handled under the federal Superfund program.
Transferring primary regulatory authority over hazardous waste to state and local
governments could lead to substantial environmental improvements. A lessening of federal
regulatory requirements could induce states to further enhance their own programs.153
Furthermore, insofar as hazardous waste policy involves trade-offs among competing subjective
values, decentralized control would lead to greater accountability and consideration of competing
environmental policy goals. As Landy, et al., explain:
Decentralization offers several advantages for preserving responsibility and
fostering civic education. The national government is remote, both spatially and
psychologically. Political processes in Washington are complex, cumbersome,
and difficult to influence compared with smaller units of government. . . .
Limiting federal involvement also discourages the naïve notion that those who are
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not at fault have no responsibility for solving a problem. It helps citizens to
recognize that, to an important degree, hazardous waste belongs to that category
of nuisances—like crime, and natural disasters—that make demands on the entire
community.154

III.

THE PROPER FEDERAL ROLE

State primacy in hazardous waste policy does not mean that the federal government has
no role to play. To the contrary, while the federal role should recede in some respects, there are
strong arguments for greater federal action in others. The present need is not so much for less
federal involvement as it is better federal involvement achieved by concentrating on those areas
in which the federal government has a comparative advantage.155 Specifically, the federal
government should focus its efforts on those areas in which, either due to economies of scale or a
particular federal interest, federal involvement can avoid needless duplication, inefficiency, or
interstate conflict. This means that the federal government should provide greater levels of
technical and scientific support, maintain its emergency removal capacity, develop more
effective means of addressing interstate spillovers, and maintain regulatory primacy over
interstate transportation of and commerce in hazardous wastes.

A. Scientific Research and Technical Guidance
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There is little question that there are economies of scale in some types of scientific
research that can inform the development of hazardous waste management programs and waste
site cleanups. While much of the information required for effective environmental protection is
local in nature, as discussed above, much of the relevant scientific knowledge will apply
nationwide.156 The health or environmental risks posed by given substances in given quantities
or concentrations, and the rate at which contamination disperses in given media, are the sorts of
complex technical matters that can best be investigated at the federal level. Asking each state to
conduct its own risk assessments would be exceedingly wasteful, particularly when one
considers the thousands of materials that can be regulated as hazardous wastes.157 The General
Accounting Office, in recommending greater state involvement in waste site cleanups, noted the
need for increased technical support from the federal government for states to perform such
functions effectively.158 With more technical and scientific information at the ready, state
officials will be more able to manage the environmental risks hazardous wastes may pose.
Similarly, the federal government can play a valuable role in identifying and describing
“best practices” in hazardous waste management and documenting various waste site cleanup
methods. As the GAO reported, states would benefit from the EPA’s assistance “in developing
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innovative cleanup technologies and in evaluating their effectiveness.”159 There is even value in
having the federal government act as a central repository for information about various
regulatory and non-regulatory strategies for dealing with hazardous waste policy questions.160 In
this fashion, the federal government can help inform state-level policy decisions, by clarifying
the relevant costs and benefits of given actions, without displacing local expertise or values.
This could produce more informed waste policy decisions that remain consistent with local
needs, values, and concerns.

B. Regulation of Interstate Commerce

There is substantial interstate commerce in hazardous waste management services. In
2005, over four million tons of hazardous waste was shipped across state lines.161 Insofar as
transportation and shipment of hazardous waste presents risks to environmental and public
health, this interstate waste trade should continue to be regulated at the federal level so as to
ensure a uniform set of rules for all waste-related interstate commerce. A single set of
transportation regulations, perhaps quite similar to those already in place under RCRA requiring
recordkeeping and proper storage and containment during transport, will be more efficient than
variable state and local rules. Further, the environmental and public health risks posed by the
transportation of hazardous wastes are distributed across those jurisdictions through which such
wastes travel, and are not localized the way the individual facilities or waste sites are. Even if
159
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existing transportation and reporting regulations need to be reformed, they should remain the
province of the federal government.
Not only should the federal government retain responsibility for regulating this interstate
commerce, it should preempt state regulation of hazardous waste transportation, insofar as such
regulations threaten to disrupt interstate markets in waste management services. The dormant
commerce clause already bars states from adopting measures that limit the importation of waste
from other states,162 as does the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act.163 Yet
it is also important that states are prevented from adopting purportedly nondiscriminatory
measures that would unnecessarily impede interstate commerce. Were each state allowed to
adopt its own regulations governing the transportation of hazardous wastes, haulers could face of
disruptive patchwork of variable, and potentially conflicting, requirements. If allowed to adopt
protectionist measures that impose a substantial share of their costs on outsiders, states are likely
to do so. The proliferation of variable standards could balkanize interstate markets, eliminating
the efficiencies that result from a vibrant interstate market in waste management services. Waste
management facilities that serve larger markets may take advantage of economies of scale to
handle waste more efficiently and with less environmental risk. A lack of federal preemption
could also allow an individual state with particularly stringent transport regulations to set the de
facto national standard, effectively imposing the environmental preferences of its residents on
the nation as a whole. If a given state is particularly vulnerable to the risks of improper waste
management, or its citizens simply desire greater levels of protection, a state would remain free
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to adopt more stringent controls on the management, treatment, and disposal of waste within its
borders. Such measures can be adopted without imposing discriminatory burdens on interstate
commerce.

C. Interstate Spillovers

The presence of interstate spillovers, such as occur when pollution crosses state lines,
present an unimpeachable argument for federal involvement.164 Hazardous waste management,
disposal, and cleanup are rarely the source of such spillovers however.165 Where there is
evidence that groundwater contamination or other environmental contamination caused by
hazardous waste is crossing, or threatens to cross state lines, there should be recourse to the
federal government. This does not require the creation or maintenance of a comprehensive
national regulatory scheme, however. All that is necessary is a mechanism whereby a polluted
state may seek recourse against the polluting jurisdiction.
A potential model for a federal regulatory mechanism to control interstate spillovers of
this sort can be found in Section 126 of the Clean Air Act.166 Under this provision, where a
downwind state believes that it is the victim of air pollution from an upwind facility in another
state, it may petition the EPA to regulate the upwind source directly. Under this model, where
there is evidence that existing waste disposal facilities or contaminated waste sites are causing,
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or threaten to cause, contamination of water or property in another state, states would have a
recourse under federal law. Ideally, such a mechanism would provide affected states with a right
to injunctive relief, in addition to compensation for harms incurred.
It is important to note that the federal role in such a context is not to create broad
regulatory standards with nationwide application. Rather, the role of the EPA in such a context
is solely to prevent activities in one state from harming those in another state. Even where
improper hazardous waste management and disposal causes harm in multiple states, as could
occur where a given site pollutes a regional aquifer, this would still counsel a regional, as
opposed to national, solution that takes into account the environmental particulars of the affected
region. Water pollution could permeate a regional watershed without impacting the nation as a
whole.

D. Emergency Cleanup

Even those who call for reforms to allow for greater state leadership, if not complete
control, of hazardous waste site programs acknowledge that EPA removal actions have played a
“critical role.”167 Although states and local governments traditionally play the role of “first
responders” in case of natural disasters and other emergencies, it appears that the federal
government retains a comparative advantage in the provision of specialized crisis management
functions, such as the rapid, emergency removal or containment of newly discovered hazardous
wastes that may pose an immediate risk to human health or the environment. Such actions have
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been the most cost-effective aspect of the Superfund program from the start.168 Given the
success of such efforts, there is a strong case for retaining federal responsibility for emergency
cleanup and removal of hazardous materials, particularly if federal assistance can be deployed
rapidly and efficiently to locations where quick removal actions are necessary.

IV.

TRANSITION RULES

Reorienting the respective federal and state roles in hazardous waste management
presents a challenging transition problem. One possible means of facilitating the transfer of
authority from the federal to state government is to gradually phase out federal requirements over
a defined schedule. States that wish to assume control of hazardous waste policy within a shorter
time frame, and seek to be free of existing federal requirements within their jurisdiction, could
also be provided with an opportunity to petition the federal government for early relief from
federal rules.
Elsewhere this author has developed and described how an “ecological forbearance”
mechanism could be used to provide states with greater flexibility and autonomy in
environmental policy.169 This mechanism would allow states to seek greater flexibility than is
allowed for under existing environmental laws. Specifically, a state would have the right to file a
petition asking the EPA to forbear enforcement of a given regulatory provision, so as to enable
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the state to adopt more cost-effective or environmentally useful measures. A forbearance
petition would identify those rules from which a state was seeking relief and the rationale for the
request. The petition would be reviewed by the EPA in a public notice-and-comment
rulemaking so as to facilitate public dialogue on the request and encourage political
accountability.
The ecological forbearance mechanism could be used to enhance flexibility generally,
and could also be used to facilitate the rapid transfer of regulatory authority from the federal
government to those states that are already in a position to take over hazardous waste policy
concerns within their state. States could use the process to seek greater leeway for setting
enforcement priorities, management and disposal requirements, or cleanup standards. In each
case, states would be able to customize their rules to local conditions and innovate with
experimental approaches to waste management.
Adopting a forbearance petition process for federal hazardous waste regulations would
not radically alter the existing regulatory environment overnight, however. There is substantial
inertia built into the policy-making process. This means that such changes would likely begin
modestly, and grow over time, with states learning from each other’s experiments and
innovations. In this way, actual experience could inform the ultimate contours of federal and
state action in the area of hazardous waste.
In the case of waste site cleanup, the federal government should refrain from adding any
additional sites to the NPL. Furthermore, states should be given management authority over all
sites within their borders. In the case of truly “orphan” sites, it may be necessary to retain a level
of federal involvement. There are means of transferring such sites out of federal hands as well,
however. For instance, the federal government could hold a “reverse auction” for such sites,
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asking management firms to bid on how much they would need to be paid by the federal
government to assume ownership and responsibility for orphan sites.170

CONCLUSION

Federal hazardous waste policy has become particularly wasteful and inefficient.
Although hazardous waste problems are among the most localized of environmental concerns,
federal hazardous waste laws are among the most centralized of federal environmental laws. In
order to foster greater jurisdictional matching, primary responsibility for the regulation and
cleanup of hazardous wastes should be returned to state governments. The federal government
has an important role to play in hazardous waste policy, but this role requires more targeted and
specialized efforts than the adoption and maintenance of a comprehensive cradle-to-grave
regulatory system and a large scale waste site cleanup program that impose federal standards on
local communities. Through technical guidance federal agencies can inform local waste
management and cleanup decisions without imposing uniform federal standards that fit few
jurisdictions well.
With federal efforts confined to those areas in which the federal government possesses a
comparative advantage, state governments will be freed to reassume leadership in hazardous
waste policy and tailor state policies to local needs and concerns. This, in turn, could foster
greater recognition of and accountability for the trade-offs inherent in hazardous waste policy,
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and a more justifiable regulatory regime for hazardous waste. Insofar as questions of hazardous
waste policy turn on subjective preferences about risk and ecological value, they are particularly
well suited to local control. It is time for a hazardous waste policy devolution.

